

THE LOCKHART REPORT

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Lockhart, Jack Herbert, 1909-

WAR DEPARTMENT
Bureau of Public Relations
June 3, 1946



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US Army Military History Institute



Presented by -

GEN Chester V. Clifton

WAR DEPARTMENT

BUREAU OF PUBLIC RELATIONS

WASHINGTON

June 3, 1946

Dear General Parks:

On May 1, 1946, at the invitation of you and Lt. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Director of Information, and through arrangements made with Mr. Roy W. Howard and Mr. John Sorrells, of the Scripps-Howard Newspapers, I undertook to make a survey of the operation of the Bureau of Public Relations of the War Department.

The report on that survey is transmitted herewith. It is divided in two parts. The first part deals with general policies and operation of the Bureau. The second part concerns specific applications of policies and operation methods. I hope that the report will be helpful.

I want to take this opportunity to commend General Collins, you, and others who are directing the Bureau for your sound purposes and principles in seeking to conduct the War Department's public relations in the best interest of both the Army and the American people. Given cooperation from other divisions of the War Department, I believe you are bound to be highly successful.

Sincerely yours,
s/s JACK H. LOCKHART
Jack H. Lockhart
Civilian Consultant

Maj. Gen. F. L. Parks, USA
Director, Bureau of Public Relations
War Department
Washington, D. C.

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April 30, 1946

I M M E D I A T E

R E L E A S E

SCRIPPS HOWARD EXECUTIVE TO SURVEY
WAR DEPARTMENT BUREAU OF PUBLIC RELATIONS

A survey of the efficiency and serviceability of the War Department's Bureau of Public Relations will be made during the next 60 days, Lieutenant General J. Lawton Collins, Director of Information, announced today.

The survey will be made by Jack H. Lockhart, assistant to John H. Sorrells, executive editor of the Scripps-Howard Newspapers, and former assistant director in charge of the press section of the Office of Censorship under Byron Price. Mr. Lockhart, who is being loaned by Scripps-Howard for the job, will serve as a civilian consultant to Major General Floyd L. Parks, Director, War Department Bureau of Public Relations.

"We want no barriers to information between the Army and the people," General Collins said. "If Mr. Lockhart finds any, we will try to cut them down."

Mr. Lockhart invited the communication to him of any suggestions of complaints.

END

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PART I

1. Civilian direction of Army public relations has been proposed, and considered by the War Department. At levels under the Secretary of War military direction of public relations prevails.

2. This gives the Army peacetime practice in war conditions. The Army will always find it hard to live happily with the press, the radio, periodicals, book publishers, motion pictures and such bridges between the Army and the public, no matter what national and world conditions may be; but it is highly difficult for the Army and these agencies of the public to get along in war. In a democracy, they have to get along if the war is to be won.

3. Direction of public relations has to be either civilian or military; joint civilian-military direction will not work because there is no such thing as coordinate authority. This does not preclude the employment of civilian ability in carrying out military direction.

4. With military men directing public relations, they need to understand the essentials and more about public relations.

5. One difficulty is that officers who are trained to make quick decisions involving the life and death of men and the fate of their country, and to readily assume responsibility, often fear "sticking out their neck" when it comes to public relations.

6. This hesitancy may come from a lack of confidence by Army officers in getting the same support from superiors in public relations matters that they expect in combat decisions. They should be able to expect to be backed up for action, if not for decision, from the highest level down, in public relations as well as in other military duties.

7. Too, men generally avoid the unknown, and shyness toward public relations among Army officers may result from the officers' lack of knowledge of the public agencies and how and why they operate.

8. The press, radio, periodicals, motion pictures, book publishers are not agencies of Government. They are privately-owned public agencies. There is no compulsion in our Nation that requires these public agencies to be for the Government, the President, or the Army, to support them or further their work. Opposition can be honest and sincere, and it can be helpful.

9. The fact is only that these agencies are in the business of furnishing news, enlightenment and entertainment to the public, and that the Army is one source of news, enlightenment and entertainment.

The Army will be a source with or without Army cooperation.

10. The surest thing is that the unfavorable that may be in the source will get to the public, as well as more or less of the favorable. To choke off the unfavorable and give the public only the favorable about the Army is impossible; it won't work. One reason is that this procedure increases the news value of the unfavorable and decreases interest in the favorable.

11. The source must be made as sound as possible, and the unfavorable acknowledged. The favorable side should be told fully. Then the Army and the people can say with honesty and conviction: This is the Army. And it will be the whole story.

12. If the Army is good, the story will be good—and public relations will be good. If the Army is bad, the story will be bad and the result bad. In the end, public opinion about the Army reflects what the Army itself is. That is the whole secret of Army public relations.

13. All any public relations group of the Army can do, in the long run, is present the Army as it is, not as it ought to be or would like to be. No more than that can be expected, or achieved.

14. This truth is difficult for some Army personnel to realize and accept. They want the Army to be an ideal army, a perfect army, in the public mind, no matter what it may be in actuality. This desire for a paper army of perfection only is a sure course to an army rotten in fact.

15. In telling the story of the Army, the Secretary of War, a civilian, should be the front-runner for War Department public relations in all respects. To do this the Secretary must be fully informed on the War Department and its activities, and must speak out.

16. The Chief of Staff, the military head of the Army, should talk frequently and frankly to the people about the state of the Army.

17. The Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, and their assistants, should inform the Bureau of Public Relations promptly of any information they release, since the Bureau frequently will be asked to confirm their action and to furnish additional details.

18. The Director of Information and the Director of the Bureau of Public Relations should be what their titles designate. Nobody should stand between them and their superiors, the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, and they must have the complete confidence of their superiors. To do a good job in public relations, the Directors must know what is going on in the War Department, and why.

19. The Director of Information and the Director of the Bureau of Public Relations should participate in all War Department policy planning and decisions. And they should be given time to prepare before policy is broken in the face of the public, Congress and Army personnel. In this, as in other Army action, preparation should precede operation. Explanation should set stage for incident, not follow it tardily and weakly.

20. General Eisenhower has said that public relations are a command concern. To maintain good public relations should be a command mission throughout the Army. Command indifference, neglect, ignorance, abuse, or opposition to public relations can make futile the work of the most able and hard-working PRO or public relations group, can quickly tear down more good will than subordinates can ever build up. Army command always has itself at its own mercy when it comes to public relations.

21. The people have turned on the Army since the war, it is true. But to some extent that is because the Army, after close contact with them during the war, has turned away from the people. The Army has to live with the people, work with them, play with them, and have contacts with them. If it doesn't, the Army will have no public relations.

22. Don't let the Army retire to obscurity now that the war is over. Constantly present it to the public. The motto might be: The Army—Not In Its Shell But On the Half-Shell.

23. Public relations must be cultivated and pruned. They are not an odd job. They won't grow without intelligent attention. And weeds will grow into them unless they are worked over at frequent intervals. You can't furlough your public relations or demobilize them until you need them—or they won't be there when you need them, and you'll have to start from scratch. And that causes a lot of scratching.

24. Public relations are difficult to channel-ize or routine-ize. Public relations are fluid, can change even from hour to hour and usually do from day to day. There must be some responsible improvisation in handling public relations, and a general attitude of quick response and reaction. Tradition, precedent, prejudice, established practice and such growths from the past must be constantly challenged lest they impede public relations without good reason and protect inertia.

25. Public relations should be decentralized as much as possible. But this requires careful coordination and supervision to prevent conflicts in operation. And decentralization can tend toward boon-doggling and feather-bedding. Trite as it is, quality and not quantity should be the rule; in other words, *all the news* about the Army, no crap.

26. Public relations cost money, in the case of the Army, the taxpayers' money. They should be worth what they cost, to everybody.

27. Maintaining good public relations requires intelligence and good judgment. It is not a job for incompetents or misfits. Nor can it be a sideline. The more experience that is brought to the job, the better. Study of the problems involved and training can be helpful. But most important of all is possession and application of common sense.

28. The combination of these qualities, or the ability to acquire them, will be found only in the highest character of personnel. None but this type of personnel should be assigned to public relations. They will need all of their ability to carry out their work not only with the public but with their fellow officers.

29. The assignment of personnel who cannot think and who live rigidly by regulations should be especially avoided.

30. Four essentials in maintaining public relations are: Accessibility, Frankness, Speed, Authority.

31. A responsible source for information about the Army must be available at all hours of the day and night, seven days a week.

32. Responses to requests for information must be full and complete, no half truths.

33. Operations must be carried on with snap. Speed is of greater importance to news agencies than it is even to the Army. The necessity for speed in dealing with news matters cannot be over-emphasized.

34. The spokesman for the Army must be someone not likely to be reversed two hours later.

35. Administrative success in maintaining public relations lies in simple, fundamental things: answering queries and correspondence promptly, telling the whole truth, abolishing buck-passing, presenting facts intelligently, understanding news operations, work, courtesy, aggressiveness, frankness.

36. All of these general, and rather obvious, observations boil down to the following procedure for carrying on Army public relations.

A. Decentralized public relations maintained by capable, trained personnel with command support in carrying out an aggressive information program initiated and supported by the Bureau of Public Relations.

B. Alertness in the Bureau of Public Relations and close cooperation from all War Department levels to assure

that Army policies and activities are carried out so as to gain maximum public benefit.

C. Collaboration of the Bureau of Public Relations in all War Department policy and activity planning, and preparation of the public.

37. Some suggestions regarding the present and future application of this procedure are made in the attachment to this general report.

38. Early in my stay here the following definition was worked out for the meaning and purpose of Army public relations:

A. The United States Army is part of the United States, made up of people of the United States who live with people of the United States. The relations of Army people to the people with whom they live are the relations as between neighbors. The relations can be good, for reason, or bad, for cause.

B. The United States Army is also a public utility, serving the people of the United States in a vital way. As a public utility it has a character and reputation that parallel the character and reputation of the individual people who make up the Army.

C. The reputation and character of neither the Army as a utility nor the people who make up the Army can be bad without reflecting on the other. The relations between Army personnel and their neighbor people are in the hands of each individual member of the Army. The relations between the Army as a utility and the people of the United States are a command concern of the Army.

D. It is the responsibility of each Army individual to build his own character and reputation in his community. It is the responsibility of Army command to build the Army's character and reputation in the Nation. The discharge of these responsibilities in the best possible manner constitutes Army public relations.

39. This definition and the principles set out in this report are high purposed. They mean nothing unless they are accepted and implemented by officers in every department, division, branch and section of the Army, not only by officers assigned to public relations. Good public relations won't be brought about by intentions or endorsements or half-hearted cooperation. They grow out of the whole Army and it will take the active cooperation of the whole Army to make them flourish.

40. The principles and program set out in this report are

for maintaining public relations by the Army in a nation at peace. In time of war, security becomes paramount and there will necessarily be a shifting of the center of gravity.

41. Since this is so, the Director of Information and the Director of the Bureau of Public Relations have an important present duty in relation to the future. They must prepare to maintain public relations and continued public support for the Army when security is controlling.

42. This is a difficult but vital job. It means consideration and planning now for operations under war conditions.

43. Coordination and release of information about an expanded Army—Censorship of the press and radio—Accreditation and handling of correspondents—Information policies regarding prisoners of war—Review practices—Handling of communiques—Policies regarding soldier mail—Constant and intelligent revision of stops—And, above all, a realistic determination of what constitutes security.

44. These are problems that should be considered now. For when war comes, there is no time. And public relations suffer accordingly and the war effort is impeded because these informational planning duties have not been carried out in advance.

PART II

1. The following observations, suggestions and comments are offered as a supplement to the general report on Army public relations, and are intended as specific applications of principles set out in the general report.

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2. Personnel assigned to public relations must develop a genuine liking for and interest in their work, news people, and news mediums. News people are quick to detect the officer who is dealing with them at arm's length with mental scorn, and only because he has been assigned to the job.

3. Public relations officers should read "Editor and Publisher" regularly and promptly. They should attend local, regional and national editorial meetings of all kinds, mix with news people, visit news offices, familiarize themselves with news operations and practices.

4. In Washington, such men as the bureau chiefs of the three principal news associations, the editors and managing editors of the four newspapers, the officers of the National Press Club and the Gridiron Club should be the friends of the principal War Department public relations officers, and frequent contact should be had with them.

5. I suggest that it would be good operating practice for the heads of the Bureau of Public Relations to take the press and radio gallery listings in the Congressional Directory, and methodically work through them, making a personal contact with each newsman listed.

6. The chiefs of bureaus for principal newspapers outside Washington, and the bureau personnel of national magazines, should receive special attention. The value in public relations of such personal contact and friendship cannot be over-emphasized.

7. PROs in the field should follow the same practice in their localities.

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8. I have suggested to the group headed up by Colonel Fielder that what the Bureau most needs, in my opinion, is a desk-chained watch-dog to be alert at all times for news developments affecting the Army, to decide what action should and can be taken, and to initiate that action promptly.

9. This man—call him watch-dog, trouble-shooter, city editor, news seismograph or Public Relations G-2—would have no other duties than to receive, within minutes of their distribution, significant news items affecting the Army from the

news wires, radio news broadcasts and commentators, the local newspapers edition by edition, and all other possible sources.

10. With the items in hand, this man would decide whether an answer, a denial, explanation, investigation, or further information was called for. If any of these were necessary, he would get the item, with the indicated course of action, immediately to the proper person in the Bureau for handling.

11. This man would not himself prepare the answer, denial, information, etc., but would immediately turn his attention to upcoming items. Quick action and constant attention would be his orders. He would never leave his post unattended, would not be subject to conferences or anything else that would take him away from his duty.

12. The Director and the Deputy Director have too many calls on their time and attention to permit them to do this job, in my opinion, however much they might try. They probably would welcome the feeling that somebody capable was watching everything and doing something about it if any doing was required.

13. If an item appeared in the noon edition of one of the Washington newspapers that reflected on the Army and the Army's public relations, this man would spot it within minutes after the edition is available. He would suggest that the facts behind the item be examined. If the facts eliminated or diminished the reflection, a press release explaining the true situation might be in order within a matter of hours. If the reflection was just, the Army might want to announce it would do something about the situation, again in a matter of hours.

14. This man would not follow through on the action taken, but would initiate the matter speedily. If an important story appeared quoting an "Army spokesman," and that spokesman was unknown to the Bureau, this man would get the Bureau into action to find out who the spokesman was. That is information the Bureau needs and should get for itself before some newsman asks for identification of the spokesman.

15. I feel that the creation of such a job would do more to bring the Bureau alive and add speed and efficiency to its operations than any one other thing.

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16. I suggest that an order be issued directing all commanding officers not to bar newsmen, including radio newsmen and photographers, from any area under their jurisdiction without immediately and fully informing the Director of BPR of the circumstances and the reason for the action.

17. Personally, I believe the order should direct command-

ing officers never to bar newsmen. But I suppose this is impossible. Certainly the barring action should be used rarely and only with the approval of BPR. In 99 cases out of a hundred, such barring action is not necessary, and it is never desirable from a public relations point of view.

18. Commanding officers who try to bar newsmen from the scene of accidents, riots, mutiny and the like seldom accomplish much other than the creation of ill will and more prominence and interest for the happening than it would normally have.

19. The Army, after all, is part of the United States and should play the game by the same rules the rest of us play it. The caste system causes as much friction between groups as it does between individuals.

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20. While the material is still readily available, BPR might want to make a study of the handing of the news of the atomic bomb. I am fairly familiar with how this was set up and handled, and I think it affords a good example of public relations preparedness, coordination, adequate background, etc. Such a study might prove profitable if BPR is called on to handle a major news event.

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21. There is a feeling among some newsmen covering the Bureau that the Bureau does not protect the security of their inquiries. That is, a newsman will ask individually and exclusively for information on a subject. Perhaps the subject is a hot one and the answer is hot. Instead of giving him the answer, the Bureau calls a press conference and gives the answer generally. The newsman who asked the original question sees his initiative thwarted, and turns away from the Bureau. He tries to get the answers elsewhere, by-passing the Bureau.

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22. I think the bureau should consider the establishment of branch offices in New York, because of its importance as a news center, and Los Angeles. These would be direct branch offices of the Bureau and not part of some other command. They would be in quick and constant contact with BPR.

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23. I am told that a recent press association inquiry to the Bureau about facilities for an emergency operation overseas on a news correspondent was referred to the Surgeon-General who brushed off the inquiry and gave no satisfactory information. This buck-passing is damaging to the Bureau and to public relations. This is a case where the Bureau should have gotten the

answer fully and promptly and given it to the press association. Such consideration pays off heavily in public relations.

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24. The popular Army news map service seems to have been discounted. Why can't it be picked up, say on a once-a-month basis, for distribution to the press and a limited group of others who can use it for news background. A current map, for instance, might cover the situation in China, or in Iran. Or redefine the occupation zones in Germany and the distribution of troops. Or show the distribution of troops in Japan. These are all things of interest to the public that reflect on the job the Army has to do, and they would tend to swing the public in behind the Army.

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25. I would ban the use of "no comment" by anyone in the Bureau in answer to inquiries. If the Bureau is asked something, it should answer, say it doesn't know but will get the answer, or explain why it can't answer. A "no comment" from the Bureau is a challenge to any newsman to try to get the information somewhere else. If the newsman does get the information elsewhere, the Bureau is left flat on its face in a ridiculous position. The "no comment" phrase is a slick answer and a wholly unsatisfactory one. It may be all right for presidents, prime ministers and kings, but it is not becoming to lesser persons.

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26. Someone from the Bureau should be constantly traveling the field, talking to field PROs about their problems, getting their views, inviting their suggestions, bringing back their ideas to BPR. One of the major jobs of such a traveler would be to locate unsympathetic and non-cooperative COs and to make suggestions for their education.

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27. Field PROs should be encouraged to maintain frequent contacts with BPR, they should be provided with general suggestions for public relations programs, their suggestions should receive prompt and careful consideration in BPR. These field PROs are the men on BPR's team; BPR should know them, how they play, and what rules their CO is forcing them to play. BPR should be a headquarters, a *service* headquarters, for the field PROs.

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28. Periodic spot checks by an experienced Army newsman should be made of the output of field PRO offices. If they are going in for quantity instead of quality, they should be cut off.

If their output is shoddy and not a credit to the Army, steps should be taken to improve it. If they are not active, they should be spurred. Outside opinion as to the operation of the local PRO offices should be obtained from local editors and press association correspondents. BPR should be constantly alert and working to find the weak spots and the unfavorable spots, and eliminate them.

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29. I like the idea of the PRO school at Carlisle Barracks, and think it is a step in the right direction. As I understand the instruction program there, it might be wise to have greater participation of civilian newsmen. This might be well handled by having a radio news commentator, a managing editor or city editor, a photographer, a news magazine man and a woman's editor spend a weekend at the school in a seminar that would allow plenty of time for the PROs to hear the civilians, ask them questions, hear them discuss problems in a forum, etc. Properly planned and handled, this should be interesting and helpful to the PROs.

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30. Some control should be set up to assure that PROs graduated from the school continue in PRO work and are not shunted to other jobs. And BPR should be able to assure the PROs that PRO work will not be a sidetrack as far as promotion is concerned, and that good work will be recognized by promotion and better assignments.

This would require that some check be kept in BPR of where PROs are, what they are doing, how they are doing, etc.

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31. The following suggestion has been made to me, and I think it is a good one.

"With regard to the period between wars, it seems to me that Army public relations needs for this period something like a 'promotion department' which could serve to humanize the Army and its personalities and functions. It would thereby get better cooperation from all concerned in the event of another war and would make any selective service process a lot easier. It could do all sorts of things to keep the public interested, maybe take a leaf or two from the National Guard's book. The latter is able to keep a large segment of the public interested over the years with the many activities in its armories through *personal participation*. That sort of thing carries even more good will than an occasional presentation of a thumb-nail sketch of General Whosis as a jolly character in carpet slippers in his cozy living room between wars, or publicizing the fact that one in ten thousand men was enabled by a PRO to get home in time

to see his dying dog, rushed half way around the world by special plane, etc."

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32. Along the line of the preceding suggestion, some ideas for possible promotion of the Army follow:

Visitors come to Washington from all over, in groups and singly, to see their Nation's capital and how their Government works. They go to various spots of interest. They go to the FBI and take a tour through that Government department, have their finger-prints taken, see the crime laboratory, the pistol range, etc. They go away impressed by the FBI and proud of it. But I don't see any visitor groups making tours through the Pentagon Building or learning anything in Washington about the Army that they can be proud of. A little planning and arranging might result in setting up a Pentagon tour, maybe once daily, that could show visitors the headquarters of their Army in Washington, a few interesting exhibits, etc. They'd feel closer to the Army as a result and might like it better. The Navy reverses this suggestion by taking battle-ships and carriers to the people, but the Army is away ahead of the Navy in Washington for possibilities in carrying out this idea.

33. Another possibility would be the establishment, as near the center of Washington as possible, of a show camp, to operate the year 'round as an example of how the Army lives, trains and works. This camp should be a model one, of course, but need not be large. It would have in use and on exhibit as much Army equipment as might be possible. It would be manned by picked men, both enlisted and officers, who would be rotated in and out of the camp, perhaps as a reward for superior performance. This would be the Army's showcase to the people of Washington and people who visit Washington. Drills, etc., would be carried out on regular schedule, publicly.

34. All ceremonies would be observed to full degree and the public would be invited to witness flag raising and lowering, changing of the guard, inspections, etc. Bugle calls should be used as much as possible, and a band. Make this something that kids would clamor to see and that their parents would like, too. I believe this could be done with from 200 to 500 officers and men, and I believe it would be well worth it.

35. I think the Army missed a promotional opportunity when it did not get a company of military police or some detachment at the UN meeting in New York. The Marines were there, doing guard duty, and they got a lot of mention in the New York press and were in a lot of the UN pictures. But no Army. It shouldn't have been hard for the Army to help direct

traffic or do something around the meeting that would have let the public know there is an Army.

36. The Army does a pretty good job of presenting officers and War Department dignitaries to the public on Army Day. But the program could be given a fillip if there were greater participation of enlisted men and civilians of high and low degree. In fact, I think the Army would do well on all occasions when it furnishes speakers to send out an able enlisted man with every officer. Let them share the speaking program. This would be good for the enlisted men, it would be good for the Army, and it would be good for both with the people.

37. Civilian inspection of Army installations and participation in Army activities should be encouraged in every way. During the war the Army let civilian leaders go through a day or a weekend of Army training. If they lived through it, they had a finer appreciation of the Army and its men. Let the civilians see and know by actual experience what the Army is doing in peacetime.

38. Participation of Army teams in athletic events, and use of Army installations as centers for athletic leagues, including both Army and civilian teams, should be general practice. It might be a good idea to hold an annual Army (Olympic) Games, rotating the site among various principal U.S. cities and timing the games for some local carnival, fiesta or similar celebration. At these games the Army could get its champion marathoner, sprinter, boxer, fencer, etc., with both officers and men competing. With a little handling and promotion, this could develop, I think, into a major sports event, and its benefits would extend clear back to every post and installation on a year 'round basis.

39. The Army band should tour principal cities constantly and in Washington in the summer it should play outdoor concerts.

40. Army units should parade often.

41. Army maneuvers should be planned for show as well as training. Don't hold them in the center of a desert unless it is absolutely necessary for training. Invite newsmen to the maneuvers and see that they have proper facilities. Explain to the public what the objectives are and what goes on from hour to hour and day to day. This was done in the early days of the war, and it is not necessary to say that it was highly interesting to the public and effective in behalf of the Army. Civilian leaders should be invited to witness the maneuvers. With some promotional planning, these maneuvers can be turned into a little war which the public will follow interestedly.

42. In addition to Army Day, the Army should tie in with

appropriate holidays in a way that will present the Army to the public. Washington's birthday, Lincoln's birthday, Memorial Day, the 4th of July, Armistice Day are all holidays that have a military background, and the Army can integrate itself into community Thanksgiving and Christmas observances.

43. There are literally hundreds of other ways in which the Army can be legitimately, and with benefit to everybody, promoted with the public. But this is not going to happen unless a definite policy to make it happen is adopted, and unless ability and time are given to the job. If the job was done, even half-way right, there is no doubt that the Army would reap great benefits.

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44. I believe that the Army should find within its ranks and develop a military writer who would do a military column, probably weekly, for general distribution to the press and radio. This column would deal, in language understandable and interesting to the layman, with military developments, weapons, tactics, etc. It would not be a propaganda column but would stick to factual reporting of military news. Photographs to illustrate this column should be available when necessary, as in the case of new equipment. And the pictures should not be inert but should have life. This writer might review famous battles, with diagrams showing as simply as possible what happened. His purpose, in general, would be to keep alive in the public interest in the military.

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45. In all of its public relations the Army must remember that all the fine words that may be said or printed about the Army can be undone by one incident reflecting unfavorably on the Army. The public in the long run will judge the Army not by what it says but by what it does. Incidents have more impact than words and are longer remembered. The Army must do all it can, as a public relations job if for no other reason, to prevent unfavorable incidents happening. When they do happen, and they will in spite of all that may be done, they should be acknowledged and cleaned up promptly.

46. From my observations of BPR, one of the things most needed is two or three good legmen constantly at work in the Pentagon Building, pushing their way into War Department offices, finding out what is going on in the War Department and the Army, and turning it in as news to BPR. It is apparent that BPR is not receiving full cooperation from other War Department branches. This generally does not result from any unwillingness to cooperate, but from the fact that most of the

time the officers working on a policy, project or activity do not recognize that it is news. So the Bureau never learns of it, or learns too late. And the Army misses another chance to favorably present itself to the public.

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47. From the viewpoint of public relations, present operation of the Analysis Branch of BPR warrants consideration.

A. Much of the present work of this branch does not contribute to furthering public relations, but instead is a sort of Reader's Digest service for the benefit of Army officers. In this work as a service bureau for the Army internally, the Analysis Branch is doing more of a library job than a public relations job.

B. Generally, the attention of the Analysis Branch is directed backward, not forward. It largely determines what public opinion already has developed; practically nothing is done toward making public opinion. Some checks on existing public opinion is necessary as a basis for planning action. But as far as BPR's prime mission is concerned, the most accurate and thorough check on public opinion is meaningless unless it serves as the basis for aggressive informational action. There is no evidence of this in BPR or the Analysis Branch.

C. On the premise that if it doesn't affect public relations, it isn't a BPR function, a curtailment program for the Analysis Branch was drawn up and discussed with the head of the branch.

D. The branch head convincingly pointed out that much of the work of the Analysis Branch might be justified as improving the relations of BPR with the remainder of the War Department; that much of the work is done on direct order from high levels because no other War Department section can do it; that much of the work does contribute finally, in an indirect way, toward public relations; and that much of the work, having been done for a period of time, cannot now be discontinued without prevailing protest. The branch head also pointed out that there has been curtailment of Analysis Branch activities that could be ended in recent months, and that he is constantly trying to end other activities as that may be possible.

E. The program suggested to the branch head is set out below. It is based on limiting functions of the branch to those strictly affecting public relations. The comments in parentheses are those of the branch head as to the feasibility of the suggestions.

F. Analysis Branch Program

- RESEARCH SECTION— Discontinue "Report of Trends in Negro Press," include necessary material in overall survey of editorial opinion. (?)
- Discontinue after Oct. 1 "Civil Affairs in Occupied and Liberated Territory." (No)
- PRESS SECTION— Discontinue "Wire Service Bulletin" and abolish section. (No)
- WIRE SERVICE SECTION— Discontinue "Press Digest." (Possible)
- INFORMATION SECTION— Discontinue "Periodical Digest." (Possible)
- CABLE SECTION— Discontinue work and abolish section. (No)
- RADIO INTELLIGENCE— Discontinue "Radio Digest." (No)
- PLANNING SECTION— Activate and strengthen. (Yes)
- FURTHER SUGGESTIONS— Increase frequency of Report on Subjects of Current Army Public Relations Problems. Implement this report by aggressive action programs to meet problems. (Yes)
- Continue Information Sheet activity. (Yes)
- Discontinue Universal Military Training (Yes) and Post-War Military Establishment Survey. (No)
- Discontinue Demobilization and Rehabilitation and Redeployment survey. (Yes)
- Set up this branch to act promptly in noting news developments and recommending desirable action to meet them. (Yes)

G. From the above comments it appears that the head of the Analysis Branch sees some curtailment in the present activities of the branch as possible now or soon. Much additional curtailment would be possible if the work were transferred to the library where it belongs, and the same money and effort could be devoted to aggressive work to further public relations.

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48. Recently I was shown a piddling press release which the Air Corps forwarded to BPR for general distribution. It concerned the formation of a group of baby sitters at an air base. An officer of the News Branch did not think it worthy of release by the Bureau and general distribution. I agreed completely. It was a good little local feature but by no means a national story bringing any particular public support for the Air Corps and the Army. In short, the story was not important. The News Branch officer suggested the story be killed, that is, not released by BPR for general distribution. I concurred, on the ground that the story was of the kind that makes charges of frivolity and hem-stitching stand up against Army press relations activities.

49. I was told that BPR did not have authority to kill this story, had to release it willy-nilly when the Air Corps presented it. BPR, it seems to me, should have authority to shut off any publicity, anywhere in the Army, that is inefficient, trifling, unsound or otherwise objectionable for good reason. The general reputation of BPR is going to be based on Army-wide public relations activities, not on just what is done in the Pentagon Building. The public and news people are going to hold BPR responsible for all Army public relations activities, whether it is or not in actuality. BPR must have the power of veto to protect itself.

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50. Some of the correspondence I have seen from BPR has had a cold, stiff, austere tone. The strictly impersonal manner may be good form for military correspondence, but a lot of BPR's letters go to newsmen, editors, publishers, etc., who are not in the Army and who prefer warmth and sincerity in expression to form. A letter can be firm and still be friendly; it can be factual without being lifeless. Bluntness is never good in dealing with newsmen, and demands are generally unenforceable. Especially in dealing with newsmen does a soft answer frequently turn away wrath. I don't mean that BPR has to be namby-pamby or toadying. But it can be gracious without losing face; in fact, it will gain favor. In correspondence a tone pitched between formality and familiarity is best,

both the stilted and the palsy-walsy attitude should be avoided. And BPR should remember that its correspondence is particularly susceptible to getting into print or on the air some day or night. Think how the letter will look in print or sound over the radio.

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51. I suggest that BPR give careful consideration to the proposed move of the bulk of the Ground Forces Information (public relations) Section to Fort Monroe. While I realize that this is part of the policy of decentralization, I feel that this is one time when decentralization will not work well, and the Bureau will be losing strength that might well be incorporated in its body.

A. Generally, newsmen are not going to have much contact with AGF public relations men at Fort Monroe. AGF public relations men will be operating pretty much in a vacuum and contacting newsmen only through BPR channels. I don't think this will prove very satisfactory, especially in the prompt handling of queries.

B. The AGF group are going to be working for the largest component of the Army. They should be the source of much information about the Army, and they should be easily available to newsmen. Their presence in Washington, with a capable liaison group at Fort Monroe, would, it seems to me, be a great help to BRP, not only from an informational point of view but in manpower.

C. The proposed plan seems to me to parallel the action that the Navy might take in sending its public relations section to sea with the fleet. It would be better to leave it ashore, where newsmen can get to it, and let it release information received from the fleet where and in the way that it will do the most good.

D. I think this is one time when organization and channels should be weighed against efficiency of results. On that basis, some deviation from the proposed set-up might be wise as far as public relations is concerned.

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52. I think the recent action in holding up release of the Doolittle Board report for a week was bad public relations. This report was in the nature of an indictment of the Army and it is not the American practice to withhold an indictment until the defense is ready. It is true that it was decided to release the report before the Army answer was ready, but the delay of a week looked bad, like an attempt at news manipulation on the part of the Army. Except in security matters, the Army has to

operate in a goldfish bowl, and the public is going to feel it incongruous, and dislike it, if the goldfish bowl is covered up half the time like a canary cage.

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53. I have suggested that the occupation and military government job be publicized to the American public by bringing back to this country some personable officers and men who are engaged in this work for a series of radio appearances, press interviews, etc. After their tour they would return to their work.

A. This is the same practice that was followed with combat troops during the war in selling War Bonds and selling the Army to the people. The suggestion was tabled on the ground that it is too much "direct selling" of the Army.

B. What is wrong with direct selling? It worked during the war for War Bonds and the Army.

C. You can sell electric refrigerators and stoves and dishwashers in general by talking about a higher standard of living. But you move General Electric refrigerators and stoves and dishwashers by direct selling. And you can sell military preparedness and efficiency in general by talking about world conditions, but you'll only make the Army stand out—as against the Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, development of the atom bomb—by direct selling.

D. The Army is using direct selling in its most obvious form in its recruiting campaign. Why the timidity about selling the Army's tough job in occupation and military government duties?

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54. It seems the thing that BPR most needs from an overall look at its operations is speed and authority in acting. A good recent example of this was the charge of abolishment of the Marine Corps under the Army unification plan made before Congress by General Vandergrift. With the Chief of Staff in the Pacific, it took the Army five days to deny this telling charge. Apparently nobody could act with speed and authority with the Chief of Staff away. A denial five days after a charge is made allows five days for the charge to sink in and be accepted, and therefore loses effectiveness no matter how strong. The denial should have been made within hours of the charge. Any reaction from the Army to news developments should come quickly to have the most effectiveness.

A. The above is a major example. BPR daily presents lesser examples of inability to function speedily and with authority in meeting news developments. As long as this con-

dition exists, BPR will function with only part efficiency in conducting public relations.

B. The cure, it seems to me, lies in delegation of authority to BPR by the War Department, and a greater awareness of the necessity for speed in BPR and in the War Department. This will not be a simple thing to accomplish, but it is a very necessary thing.

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55. The Army must get over its tendency to protect Army personnel from publicity attending the ordinary hazards of life, including scandal. The withholding of the identification of Army personnel, casualties or otherwise, involved in accidents, wrong-doing, scandals, etc., is without security or other sound basis and is a form of preferential handling that sets up a barrier between the Army and civilians. Army personnel have no divine or other bestowed right of privilege over other citizens of the world, and the closer they live by the rules that govern the rest of the world, the better they will fit into the world. Most people who do wrong don't want their names in the papers, but they get there, and this is accepted as a good thing. But the Army frequently tries to keep the names of its wrong-doers out of the papers, and the rest of the public resents it. And when 20 persons are killed in a train wreck, their names are published as soon as identification can be made. But if Army personnel are among the 20, the Army holds back their identification until next of kin are notified. Why? Either this is good practice for the whole conduct of life, or it is not good practice for the Army. And I don't think the Army is going to change the civilian practice.

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56. I think a new look should be taken at the purposes and operation of the Pictorial Section in view of the changeover from war to peace conditions. Where pictures were in demand during the war, they now may have to be "sold" to publications. And there is a vast store of thousands of war pictures that should not be allowed to rest in the files but which should be actively mined for the benefit of the Army. At present, as I understand it, this is not being done to any great extent, and only when the pictures are sought out, and picked out, by publications who come after them.

57. It seems to me the Pictorial Section should undertake an aggressive program intended to get photographs favorable to the Army in publications, and to make such photographs available from throughout the Nation. Such a program would go beyond the present, as I understand it, coverage of outstanding news events, and would include human interest and feature photographs.

58. When I came to BPR a press release invited the sending to me of any complaints or suggestions. As a result of this I have received a number of letters from friends and strangers who are familiar with Army public relations. One of the suggestions in these letters has been set out above. The following comes from a friend, a newspaperman of considerable experience who has been engaged as a civilian in handling Army public relations during the war and since in an important activity. I have eliminated personalities.

A. "I think the Army must realize that it has done, generally speaking, a bum job. The basic cause I believe to be two-fold. First, the organizational setup as it *now stands* will not permit much improvement, and, second, there is a personal equation which will be difficult, if not impossible, to remedy.

B. "As for the first point, there is a remedy; but perhaps I should enlarge on the base before putting on the roof! In the peacetime Army, there is no *trained* public relations personnel that I know anything about, except for organizations like the Engineer Department. The public relations officers, by and large, have multitudinous other assignments, most of which require all their time; they are assigned as public relations officers largely because Army Regulations require the assignment. Their activity consists of signing letters answering inquiries from various media. Most of these letters are written in stiff 'double talk,' and fail utterly to accomplish anything except the arousal of resentment; in itself, this is not offered as a serious defect, but rather for purposes of illustration of net results. In a word, the Army considers public relations as an illegitimate child.

C. "Only rarely have I seen a high-ranking officer who had any interest whatsoever in the problem or who proposed doing anything except what might be required. I was particularly fortunate in working for two years for a general officer who not only was keenly aware of the need, but who was active in his interest and efforts. I believe we can show in this Division that it pays. Unfortunately, his successor lacks the approach and much of what has been accomplished is rapidly going by the boards. I think (an editor) present attitude is indicative of the difference in the two men. General (.) often went with me to call at (a newspaper), spent three days with me on a trip with (an editor) and (an editor) of (another newspaper), and tried like hell to make direct contact with (a general of the army) when (an editor) went to (one of the theaters); failing that, he wrote every general officer he knew in (an editor) behalf. *The new man has never met (an editor).*

D. "The conclusion from all this, then, is (1) place public relations on a proper level, which perhaps is somewhere

between where I think it ought to be and that position it now occupies, (2) insist on commanding officers giving public relations at least passing interest, (3) place trained and carefully selected personnel on public relations jobs, even if they must be civilians, (4) quit considering 'public relations' and 'publicity' as synonymous and, therefore, gaging effects of the public relations program by the number of handouts circulated.

E. "In the beginning I stated that 'there is a personal equation which will be difficult, if not impossible, to remedy.' My thinking here is, perhaps, unmentionable even from your position. I wave the West Point flag! The average Regular Army man has no more idea of the civilian mind and viewpoint than does the proverbial man in the moon. He has never been a civilian. He has been taught superiority. He takes any criticism from the public as being 'none of their damned business.' He knows all the answers. Boy, you figure that one, out!"

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59. The following letter was received from an Army installation public relations man. He was PRO for the installation while in the Army, was discharged, and was employed as a civilian in the same capacity. His letter refers to a BPR release about moving of the Coast Artillery School, sent out under the heading "Coast Artillery School to Move to Fort Winfield Scott in June," dated May 18, 1946.

A. "I enclose a copy of a WD public relations bureau release which reached my desk today (May 24). It should be perfectly clear to you why I don't slug a head on this vapid item and send it down to the local paper. We never even used this type of release in our camp paper here, except possibly for filler when we were hard up.

B. "The Bureau also issues frequent releases relating to reunion activities of various Army divisions, or the organization of division societies around the country. Unless we had a local angle we weren't interested in stories of this nature.

C. "The Bureau's 'Continental Liaison Bulletin,' however, is useful and contains good stuff now and then. Also, we in the field PRO often get very long copies of speeches by War Department officials. These generally reach us after the wires have carried the story in the local papers and even so their length is prohibitive. As a result, they are sometimes read by local officers here and then discarded. Either we should get short, concise summaries in ADVANCE of the delivery or better that they weren't sent out at all. The wires always beat us into print on items of this nature, anyway. And right there you might suggest a revolutionary change! Just release advance copies of the speech to all PROs and let us get credit for

giving local editors something new, instead of letting the wires handle them. Or maybe this is TOO revolutionary!"

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60. Field PROs and COs must understand that community activities are as much a part of public relations as informational activity, and frequently can accomplish more good for the Army.

A. BPR should be the center for inspiring community relations activity, but the bulk of the work in this activity will have to be carried on in the field. Different situations will require different approaches and handling.

B. The main thing is that field PROs must be on the alert for opportunities to fit the Army into the activities and life of their communities. The urge to do this should flow constantly from BPR to the field PROs and their COs from a BPR section which has this assignment.

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61. I have received complaints from Washington newspapermen representing newspapers outside of Washington that BPR does not fairly apportion its morning paper and afternoon paper releases. They say that morning newspapers seem to be favored, with an eye on The New York Times. They point out that there are more afternoon newspapers than morning newspapers, and that the afternoons have greater circulation.

A. I do not know what method BPR is following in setting up releases for a.m. or p.m. release, but I do know this should be carefully studied and watched, and that a sound system should be followed to get best results and to avoid charges of discrimination.

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62. Here is a memorandum sent me by a Washington newspaperman who represents several newspapers outside Washington. It was seen and concurred in by other correspondents.

A. "My chief complaint about the War Department's Press Branch is that whoever answers the phone works on the query. That is, the query may concern any of a dozen different fields of information, but it isn't referred to any individual who specializes in a particular field.

B. "Under the circumstances, the War Department employees on the News Desk do a good job, and I'm surprised they're able to do that well, considering the range of their operations. From my standpoint, however, the result is mostly pretty meager. I get an answer to my question, period. No

background information from a person conversant with the particular field. No help in analyzing or evaluating what I've got. Very rarely am I referred to anybody working in the field I'm interested in.

C. "This sets up a pretty effective wall between the War Department and my newspaper. I rarely cover the War Department; I merely call up when I have a specific query. Thus, I don't get an opportunity to develop any sources and am entirely dependent on the Press Branch. Mostly, I'll get my query answered by a civilian or an officer with no direct interest in the matter, whose instructions seem to be to answer the question and volunteer nothing.

D. "It would speed up handling of queries and provide better service if people were assigned to fields of information in which large numbers of queries develop. The civilian emergency agencies did that (WPB, OPA, CPA, etc.) with good results, both for the newspaper and the agency."

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63. Generally speaking, information about the Army and the War Department should be attributed to a specific War Department official by name. The policy of attempting to attribute all information to a "War Department spokesman" has a good purpose but it is not a sound policy from the viewpoint of practicality and public relations.

A. The press and radio do not like to use the term "War Department spokesman" and similar terms. They strongly prefer to attribute information to a definite source. Many editors require this.

B. Also, while it may be good policy, it is not in accord with human nature to require news sources to be anonymous. Any attempt to enforce that policy will only cause many of the news sources to save their information for speeches and public appearances when they will not be anonymous, or to leak information to places where they will get credit in mention. This tends to substitute conniving and subterfuge for a free and wholesome flow of information that is under direction of BPR and that will have favorable public effect.

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C. BPR should be the PRO for every director and every division, section and branch of the War Department. This does not mean that BPR will supersede any director or unit, or will take away any credit due.

D. It should mean that BPR will earnestly try to be helpful to each director and unit in public relations. And it means that BPR requires the help of each War Department

director and unit in maintaining and furthering public relations so that the Army may accomplish its mission with strong public support.

E. When any director or unit of the War Department releases information about the Army, the whole public should have that information. The information should be released so as to give it the widest possible public distribution.

F. That does not result when information is released to any one agency and not released simultaneously to all. The prominence that may be given to the information by the favored agency is offset by the usual result in the other agencies either ignoring the information as stale, or paying it slight attention. Instead of getting more or less even prominence from news distribution agencies across the country, the information gets great prominence in one limited area and only spotty prominence in the light of the general public.

G. Widest possible public distribution of the information has been prevented rather than achieved by this exclusive, and excluding, release of information.


H. Another aspect of the limited release of information is that it makes the source vulnerable to the next news representative who comes along and wants an exclusive release. If the source refuses, he is open to the charge of discrimination. If he tries to comply, he is soon in a tangle of personalities and exclusives. Public relations for the news source, and for the Army, deteriorate.


64. The War Department is a daily source of news developments about the Army. The news developments should be detected by the Army itself and they should be given to the public. BPR should stand ever willing and ready to prepare general releases of information and to take all necessary steps to give the information the widest possible public distribution.

A. It may be that not one but a series of releases will be necessary. It may be that it will be best to arrange interviews, or a press conference to permit questions to be asked and answered by a director or his representative concerning a new program or policy. Whatever is necessary BPR should plan, arrange and supervise.

65. BPR can do this only if it knows what is going on in the War Department. BPR needs to be informed about news developments in the War Department. BPR needs to be informed about queries that are made directly to directors and units by news representatives. Requests for interviews should be channeled through BPR; BPR should be informed when any interview is given, and what was said.

A. BPR cannot function successfully without the cooperation of every director and unit of the War Department. BPR cannot represent the War Department to the news agencies unless it does, in fact, represent the War Department. Only by that whole cooperation and representation can BPR build up the Army with the public.





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